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Some Bayesians have suggested that beliefs based on ambiguous or incom-
plete evidence are best represented by families of probability functions. I spend
the first half of this essay outlining one version of this imprecise model of belief ,
and spend the second half defending the model against recent objections, raised
by Roger White and others, which concern the phenomenon of probabilistic
dilation. Dilation occurs when learning some definite fact forces a person’s beliefs
about an event to shift from a sharp, point-valued subjective probability to an
imprecise spread of probabilities. Some commentators find dilation disturbing,
both from an epistemic and a decision-theoretic perspective, and place the blame
on the use of sets of probabilities to model opinion. These reactions are based
on an overly narrow conception of imprecise belief states which assumes that
we know everything there is to know about a person’s doxastic attitudes once
we have identified the spreads of values for her imprecise credences. Once we
recognize that the imprecise model has the resources to characterize a much
richer family of doxastic attitudes than this, we will see that White’s charges of
epistemological and decision theoretic incoherence are unfounded.
The Basic Ideas of Bayesian Epistemology
Speaking broadly, the Bayesian approach to epistemology is based on four
interconnected ideas:
1. Belief is not all-or-nothing. Opinions come in varying gradations of
strength which can range from full certainty of truth, through equal
confidence in truth and falsehood, to complete certainty of falsehood.
2. Gradational beliefs are governed by the laws of probability, which codify
minimum standards of inductive consistency (or “coherence”) to which
rational opinions must conform.
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3. Learning involves updating a “prior” state of gradational belief to obtain
a “posterior” state that preserves as many of the prior beliefs as possible
consistent with the evidence received.
4. Rational agents use their graded beliefs, in conjunction with their desires,
to choose actions with maximum expected desirability. In particular,
someone who is determinately more confident of X than of Y will place
a higher expected value on a wager OX that offers a prize when X and a
penalty when ∼X than on a wager OY that offers the same prize when Y
and the same penalty when ∼Y .
While 1–4 are common to all versions of Bayesianism, there is no consensus
among Bayesians about how these broad principles should be implemented. One
point of contention has to do with the degree of precision with which gradational
beliefs are best represented. According to one view, the strengths of beliefs can
typically be measured in sharp numerical degrees, so that, in most contexts, we
can think of a believer’s level of confidence in a proposition X as being captured
by a single real number of cardinal significance, c(X), which falls between zero
and one. This number, the believer’s credence for X , is zero when she is certain
that X is false, one when she is certain that X is true, and is one-half when she
is exactly as confident in X ’s truth as in its falsehood. Bayesians who adopt this
precise model of graded belief construe 1-4 as follows:
1P. A believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a single credence
function c that assigns a sharp numerical degree of belief c(X) ∈ [0, 1]
to each proposition X in some Boolean algebra .2
2P. If the believer is rational then her credence function obeys the laws of
probability, so that, for all X , Y ∈ , (a) c(X v ∼X) = 1, (b) c(X &
∼X) = 0, (c) c(X v Y ) + c(X & Y ) = c(X) + c(Y ), and (d) c(X & Y ) =
c(X)·c(Y |X) where c(Y |X) is Y ’s probability on the supposition of
X ’s truth.3
3P. Learning is governed by Bayes’ Theorem. A believer who has a learning
experience in which she becomes certain of a proposition D (and learns
nothing else) should end up with a posterior credence function c∗ such
that c∗(X) = c(X)·[c(D |X)/c(D)] for all X ∈ .4
4P. Rational decision making is a matter of choosing actions that maximize
expected utility relative to one’s credences. More precisely, if an act A
produces an outcome of utility uA(Xn) for each Xn in a partition {X 1,
X 2, . . . , XN} of mutually exclusive, collective exhaustive events, then an
agent with credence function c will assess A’s choiceworthiness by its
expected utility Expc(A) =
∑
n c(Xn)·uA(Xn).
The Need for Imprecise Credences
There are a variety of problems with the idea that credences must be
precise. As many commentators have observed (see, e.g., Kyburg [1983], Levi
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[1985], Kaplan [1996]), numerically sharp degrees of belief are psychologically
unrealistic. It is rare, outside casinos, to find opinions that are anywhere near
definite or univocal enough to admit of quantification. An agent with a precise
credence for, say, the proposition that it will rain in Detroit next July 4th should
be able to assign an exact “fair price” to a wager that pays $100 if the proposition
is true and costs $50 if it is false. The best most people can do, however, is to
specify some vague range.
While psychological implausibility is one worry, a more decisive problem is
that precise degrees of belief are the wrong response to the sorts of evidence that
we typically receive. As argued in Joyce [2005], since the data we receive is often
incomplete, imprecise or equivocal, the epistemically right response is often to
have opinions that are similarly incomplete, imprecise or equivocal. Here is a
motivating example:
Black/Grey Coins. An urn contains a large number of coins which have been
painted black on one side and grey on the other. The coins were made at a factory
that can produce coins of any bias β:(1 − β) where β, the objective chance of
the coin coming up black, might have any value in the interval 0 < β < 1. You
have no information about the proportions with which coins of various biases
appear in the urn. If a coin is drawn at random from the urn, how confident
should you be that it will come up black when tossed?
Proponents of precise models have two very different reactions to this example.
They all agree that a rational believer must take a definite stand by having a
sharp degree of belief for the event of black, hereafter B. Formally, the believer’s
opinions must be captured in a probability density function (pdf) fc that maps
β’s possible values into the non-negative reals subject to ∫10 fc(x) dx = 1. This
pdf fixes a sharp probability for B via c(B) = ∫10 x · fc(x) dx, so that the person’s
credence for B is her expectation of its objective bias. Subjectivists see fc and c
as matters of personal judgment based on the believer’s inductive hunches, best
guesses about similarities among cases, and so on. Your pdf in might be the
uniform distribution cU , which has fU (x) = 1 everywhere on [0, 1] and cU (B) =
1/2, whereas I might feel that β is skewed toward lower values and have the pdf
fc(x) = 42·x·(1 − x)5, which fixes c(B) at 14 . According to the subjectivists, neither
of us is irrational. We are each entitled to our own sharp opinions when the data
runs out.
Objectivists find this absurd. We have no reason to think that any bias
is any more or less likely than any other, they say, and epistemic rationality
requires us to impartially assign symmetrically supported possibilities identical
sharp probabilities. This means that, contra the subjectivists, the only rational
credences to hold in B/G-Coins are those based on the uniform density fU . This
reasoning depends ultimately on an application of the famous (or infamous)
Principle of Indifference.
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POI. If disjoint events E1 and E2 are “equipossible” given all relevant
evidence — so that any datum that tells for/against E1 is offset by
a perfectly symmetrically datum that tells for/against E2 to the same
degree — then any rational credence function based on the available
evidence must treat E1 and E2 symmetrically by assigning them the
same sharp probability.
In the extreme case where there is no evidence POI requires c(E1) = c(E2). In
B/G-Coins, this means that events in any partition β ∈ [j/N , j+1/N ], for j =
0, 1, . . . , N, must be assigned the same sharp credences of 1/N , which is only
possible if the credence function is generated by fU .
Though POI has a checkered past [Joyce, 2009], its defenders continue
to see it as the only hope for a Bayesianism that does not degenerate into a
systematic logic of unsupported personal superstition. When asked to justify
POI, its defenders typically invoke the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) principle
[Jaynes, 2003]. MaxEnt shows that the uniform density uniquely minimizes
the amount of extra information that one must add to get sharp degree of
beliefs in cases like B/G-Coins. If we measure the amount of information
encoded in density fc by its Shannon information I(fc) =
∫
0
1 fc(x)·log2(fc(x)) dx,
then it can be shown that I(fU ) < I(fc) for all non-uniform pdfs fc. These
considerations generalize in significant ways along a range of dimensions. In
broadest terms, one starts with the largest family C of credence functions that
are not logically excluded by the data, and MaxEnt then requires believers to
adopt the unique credence function from C that minimizes Shannon information.
Moreover, if someone with sharp prior c acquires further data that fixes a set of
probability functions D, then she should update by shifting from c to the unique
d from D whose pdf minimizes Kullback-Leibler cross-information: I(fc, fd ) =∫
1
0 fc(x)·log2(fc(x)/fd (x)) dx.5 Again, the thought is that rationality requires the
adoption of sharp credences that encode the minimum amount of information
beyond what is explicitly given in the evidence, so as to minimize the extent to
which believers “jump to unsupported conclusions.”
Proponents of imprecise credences are unmoved. Even if one grants that
the uniform density is the least informative sharp credence function consistent
with your evidence in Black/Grey Coins, it is still very informative. Adopting
it amounts to pretending that you have lots and lots of information that you
simply don’t have. For example, fU commits you to thinking that in a hundred
independent tosses of the black/grey coin the chances of black coming up fewer
than 17 times is exactly 17/101, just a smidgen ( = 1/606) more probable than
rolling an ace with fair die. Do you really think that your evidence justifies such
a specific probability assignment? Do you really think, e.g., that you know enough
about your situation to conclude that it would be an unequivocal mistake to let
$100 ride on a fair die coming up one rather than on seeing fewer than seventeen
blacks in a hundred tosses? Or, to take another example, are you comfortable
with the idea that upon seeing black on the first toss you should expect a black
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on the second toss with a credence of exactly 2/3, or, more generally, that seeing
s blacks and N − s greys should lead you to expect a black on the next toss with
a probability of precisely s+1/N +2? This is Laplace’s [1825] rule of succession. If
you adopt the uniform pdf over β, as advocated by POI, you are stuck with it.6
Again, the evidence you have about the coin’s bias (viz., nada!) is insufficient to
justify such a specific inductive policy. Of course, any sharp credence function will
have similar problems. Precise credences, whether the result of purely subjective
judgments or “objective” rules like POI, always commit a believer to extremely
definite beliefs about repeated events and very specific inductive policies, even
when the evidence comes nowhere close to warranting such beliefs and policies.
The Imprecise Model
These sorts of difficulties have led many Bayesians to reject the precise model
in favor of less exacting conceptions of graded beliefs. The first such approaches,
explored extensively in Fine [1973] represented credal states using a comparative
confidence ranking. This is a pair of binary relations (.>., .≥.) each defined on
, where X .>. Y holds when the believer is determinately more confident in
X than in Y , and X .≥. Y holds when she is determinately no less confident
in X than in Y . These relations are required to satisfy the laws of comparative
probability, which can be distilled into a single general axiom:
If 〈X 1, . . . , XN〉 and 〈Y 1, . . . , YN〉 are sequences of propositions from  (that
may contain repeats), and if the sequences contain the same number of truths as
a matter of logic, then Xn .≥. Yn for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N – 1 only if YN .≥. XN
and not XN .>. YN .
As shown in Kraft et al. [1959] and Scott [1964], this condition is necessary and
sufficient for the existence of a (finitely additive) probability function c such that
c(X) > c(Y ) when X .>. Y and c(X) ≥ c(Y ) when X . ≥. Y . This function
is unique when the ranking is complete, so that X . >. Y or Y . ≥. X for all
X , Y ∈ , and atomless, so that X .>. F implies the existence of a Y ∈  with
X & Y .>. F and X & ∼Y .>. F. The ordinal approach thus includes the precise
model as a special case, but generalizes it by allowing for beliefs with less than
mathematical precision and by recognizing that a believer might not even be able
to make ordinal probability comparisons between some events.
Though more psychologically realistic, the ordinal approach can only
represent a limited range of doxastic attitudes. Consider bare judgments of
stochastic independence. People often believe that the probabilities of two events
are entirely uncorrelated even when they know nothing about the events’ chances
of coming about. One might, for instance, have no information at all either
about how likely it is to rain in Detroit next July 4th or about the chances of
the Australians winning the Ashes crickett match in 2030, but one might still be
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certain that these events have no probabilistic bearing on one another. The usual
way of representing stochastic independence is by saying that the probability
of one event X remains the same given the occurrence or non-occurrence of
another Y , so that c(X) = c(X |Y ) = c(X |∼Y ), in which case learning Y ’s
probability tells one nothing about X ’s probability (and conversely). While the
ordinal framework can capture some aspects of this relationship (e.g., X & Y .≥.
X & ∼Y when Y . ≥. ∼Y ), it lacks the resources to fully represent the richness
of independence judgments.
One can remedy this deficit by supplementing the simple ordinal model
with a third relation that holds between X and Y just when the believer sees
X and Y as stochastically independent of one another. Unfortunately, even this
addition still leaves many doxastic attitudes unrepresented. Consider what Couso
et al. [2000] call an “unknown interaction” in which a believer is entirely ignorant
about the manner in which two events might be correlated. Here is an illustration:
Game Show. You are a contestant on a game show. The host shows you two large
urns that contain balls marked “$1000”, “$500”, and “$0”. You know nothing
about the relative proportions of ball types in either urn or about the ways in
which their contents might be correlated. The host randomly pulls a ball from
one urn, but does not reveal it. He explains that you can either have the amount
on that ball plus $500, or you can randomly draw a ball from the second urn
and have the sum of the numbers on the two balls added to your fortune. Should
you pick a second ball or stand pat?
You would like to know what you can expect to earn by drawing another ball,
but since you are entirely ignorant about the composition of the second urn you
have no evidential basis for assigning definite probabilities to “$1000”, “$500”
or “$0”. Moreover, since you know nothing about the correlation, you lack the
data needed to determine the conditional probabilities c(Win $(x + y) |Draw $x)
for any x, y ∈ {1000, 500, 0}. This prevents you from fixing any definite expected
utility for your potential acts. Indeed, it is consistent with what little you know
that your objective chances of getting $2000, $1500, $1000, $500 or $0 after
drawing can be any 5-tuple of non-negative numbers summing to one. Likewise,
if you stand pat then your objective chances of getting $1500, $1000, $500 can
be any 3-tuple of non-negative numbers summing to one. So, you simply do
not know enough about the composition of the urns to know whether taking
a second ball is positively relevant, negatively relevant, or irrelevant to your
prospects of increasing or decreasing your fortune.
Friends of POI will advocate a uniform pdf, so that c(Draw $x) =
c(Win $(x + y) |Draw $x) = 1/3 for all x, y ∈ {1000, 500, 0}. Since you
are ignorant about the relative proportions of ball types in the second urn,
they say, you should assume them equal. Likewise, since you have no idea
how the contents of the two urns might correlate you should assume that your
draw and the host’s draw are stochastically independent (because you apply
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POI to the outcome of his draw conditional on the outcome of yours). If you
follow this advice then drawing and standing pat will seem equally good: your
expected utility for each is determinately $1000.7 A more subjectively inclined
proponent of precise credences will not insist on uniform distributions, but will
say that you should have some sharp values or other for both c(Draw $x) and
c(Win $(x + y) |Draw $x), thereby committing yourself both to a definite view
about the relative proportions of balls in your urn and to a definite view about
the statistical relevance of the outcome of your draw to the host’s draw.
Neither position is defensible. By hypothesis, you know nothing about the
contents of either urn or about their correlation. In particular, you have no more
or less reason to think that your draw and the host’s draw are independent than
you have to think they are perfectly correlated, or rigged so that you will end
up with zero, or anything else. You simply have no evidence that bears on these
issues at all. Postulating sharp values for c(Win $(x + y) |Draw $x) under such
conditions amounts to pulling statistical correlations out of thin air.
Examples like Game Show make it clear that the intuitive notion of one
event “providing no information about” another is ambiguous between stochas-
tic independence, which requires a great deal of evidence about probabilistic
relationships among events, and “unknown interaction,” which involves having
no such evidence. Judging X and Y to be independent involves believing that
you can ignore Y entirely when making probabilistic inferences about X . In
this context “provides no information about” means “is evidentially irrelevant
to”. In an unknown interaction it is consistent with what you believe that
X ’s truth-value is perfectly correlated with Y ’s truth-value, that the two are
perfectly anti-correlated, or that there is any intermediate level of correlation.
You lack the information that you need to determine whether you can ignore
Y when making inferences about X . In this context “provides no information”
means “is maximally evidentially ambiguous.”
To formulate a theory of graded belief that properly distinguishes these
notions we need an imprecise probability model. The basics run as follows:
1I. A believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a family C of
credence functions defined on some Boolean algebra . Facts about
the person’s opinions correspond to properties common to all the
credence functions in her credal state.
2I. If the believer is rational then every credence function in C is a
probability.
3I. If a person in credal state C learns that some event D obtains (and
nothing else), then her post-learning state will be CD = {c(• |D) =
c(X)·[c(D |X)/c(D)] : c ∈ C}.
4I. A rational decision maker with credal state C is obliged to prefer one
action A to another A∗ when A’s expected utility exceeds that of A∗
relative to every credence function in C.
Each point calls for commentary.
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Commentary on 1I : Elements of C are, intuitively, probability functions that the
believer takes to be compatible with her total evidence. Taken collectively they
represent her imprecise opinions in light of that evidence. We can illuminate
the idea using a picturesque analogy.8 Think of C as a huge committee in
which each member ( = credence function) has a definite degree of confidence
for each proposition in . The person’s credal state is a kind of amalgam of
the opinions of her committee members, where the amalgamation process is
constrained by Pareto considerations: if all members agree about some matter
this reflects a determinate fact about what the person believes. If c(Y ) > c(X)
for all c ∈ C then she regards Y as more likely than X . If c(X |Y ) > c(X)
for all c ∈ C then she sees learning Y as increasing her evidence for X . Issues
that divide the credence committee are issues about which the person cannot
be said to have any settled view. If c(Y ) > c(X) for some c ∈ C and c(Y ) =
c(X) for the rest, then the person determinately regards Y to be at least as
likely as X , but it is not determinate whether she regards Y as more likely than
X or sees them as equally probable. So, it’s not majority rule, and it’s not a
system in which committee members’ views are differentially weighted to force
agreement:9 it’s unanimity or ambiguity.
It is sometimes suggested that this model is even more psychologically
implausible than its precise cousin since believers must keep track of a (typically
infinite) family of credence functions, rather than just one. This is the wrong
way to think. Rather than being a model of a believer’s psychology, the credal
state is a highly formalized representation of her doxastic situation. Though
the person’s opinions are modeled by the shared properties of her “committee
members”, she herself will not think in these terms. Instead, she will make
qualitative or comparative assessments of probability and utility — that X is
more likely than Y , that X and Y are independent, that X is the evidence for
Y , that A is a better act than A∗, et cetera — and these concrete judgments are
modeled abstractly by requiring that all c ∈ C satisfy certain conditions, e.g.,
c(X) > c(Y ), c(X & Y ), = c(X)·c(Y ), c(Y |X) > c(Y ), Expc(A) > Expc(A∗),
et cetera. The believer only keeps track of her explicitly held qualitative and
comparative beliefs: the formal representation takes care of itself.
As with the precise model, there is room here for a lively subjec-
tivist/objectivist debate. Subjectivists will say that rational individuals can have
different imprecise belief states even when they face the same objective data. A
man in Game Show might have a hunch that the urns are highly correlated,
and so have c(Win $(x + x) |Draw $x) > 3/4 across his C, whereas a woman
in the same situation may think the urns are anti-correlated and reverse these
inequalities. Subjectivists deem either view legitimate. Objectivists will deny
this, arguing that there is always a single correct imprecise credal state that
a person should hold in light of a given body of data. Presumably, this state
would be the one that introduces the least amount of additional information
beyond what is in the data. It is not clear how such an “imprecise minimum
information requirement” might be formulated, but it seems clear that C1
encodes more information than C2 whenever C1 ⊂ C2 or when C2 arises
from C1 by conditioning.
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A few aspects of this debate deserve further comment. The first concerns
the relationship between credences and evidence about objective chances. Often
data imposes direct constraints on the range of possible chance hypotheses
for some event. In B/G-Coins, for example, we are told that coin’s bias
falls within (0, 1), but we might imagine variants in which β is confined
to some narrower interval (a, b). Precise credence functions then correspond
to probability densities defined over the chance hypotheses left open by the
evidence. So, in B/G-Coins with β ∈ (a, b), each c ∈ C has a pdf with fc(x) =
0 outside (a, b).
One vexed question concerns whether considerations beyond knowledge of
chances should influence credal states. One position is what Roger White calls
the Chance Grounding Thesis.
CGT. “Only on the basis of known chances can one legitimately have
sharp credences. Otherwise one’s spread of credence should cover the
range of chance hypotheses left open by your evidence.” [2010, 174]
In B/G-Coins this says that you should have a sharp credence of c(B) = b only
if you are certain that the chance of black coming up is b, so that c(β = b) = 1.
Otherwise, your credal state should have committee members whose opinions
instantiate every pdf over (0, 1). While White portrays CGT as essential to the
imprecise approach, it merely the most extreme of a range of possible positions.
Indeed, it is too extreme in one respect since sharp credences are clearly called
for in some situations where chances are unknown. Suppose you are told that
the urn in B/G-Coins contains a coin of bias 1 − β for every coin of bias β.
This requires all the pdfs in your credal state to be symmetric, so that fc(x) =
fc(1 − x) for all x. The range of chance hypotheses left open by your evidence
is still (0, 1), but your committee members are, and should be, unanimous that
c(B) = 1/2.
This brings us to a second question: how should symmetry conditions
factor into the imprecise model? Even without direct evidence that forces each
function in the credal state to be symmetric, some may insist that asymmetric
densities over (a, b) should be excluded whenever data indicates only that the
true chance lies in that interval. This is a half-step from POI.10 Instead of trying
to ensure evenhanded beliefs by constituting a credence committee consisting
of the single most even-handed member, this proposal aims to achieve the
same effect by ensuring that each member is “fair and balanced” the extent
of not preferring one side of the interval over the other. As with the uniform
distribution, this yields a sharp credence of a+b/2. An even weaker symmetry
requirement, which does not generate sharp credences, is this:
Symmetry. If {E1, . . . , EN} is a partition of events that are “equipossible” in
light of all the available evidence, then a rational believer must treat the En
symmetrically in her credal state by including committee members who take all
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possible contrary views on their relative probabilities, so that for any c ∈ C and
any permutation σ of {1, 2, . . . , N} there is always a cσ ∈ C with cσ (En) =
c(Eσ (n )).
Like POI, this requires believers to afford equal treatment to possibilities not
discriminated by the data. However, “equal treatment” does not mean “equal
sharp probability” or even “symmetrical imprecise probability”, but something
more like “equal strength of support across the committee.” Picturesquely,
instead of trying to ensure an impartial belief by putting the matter in the
hands of the single most even-handed committee member, or in the hands of
“fair and balanced” members who are equally inclined toward either side of
the issue, Symmetry ensures impartiality by seeing to it that each “unbalanced”
committee member is opposed by another who is exactly as radical, relative
to the committee average, but in a contrary direction. In B/W-Coins with β ∈
(a, b) this ensures that every “left winger” whose fc generates a credence c(B)
between a and the midpoint a+b/2 is precisely offset by a “right winger” with
fc ∗ (x) = fc(a + b − x) whose credence c∗(B) falls between the midpoint and b.
Unlike the other two cases, Symmetry does not entail sharp credences: every
value in (a, b) coincides with the credence of some committee member.
A final question along these lines concerns the appropriate level of
“sharpness” for a credal state. Many versions of the imprecise model (e.g. Joyce
[2005]) assume with CGT that if the data indicates only that the chance of an
event is in (a, b) then the credal state should contain credences for the event that
cover (a, b). The most natural way to ensure this (and satisfy Symmetry) is by
having a credal state that reflects every pdf defined over the interval, including
those that place almost all their weight close to the ends and those that place
it all on one specific value. This is a plausible view (and I personally think it
is the only view that makes epistemological sense), but it has costs that some
proponents of the imprecise model might be unwilling to bear. For example,
it precludes inductive learning in situations of extreme ignorance. Suppose you
(independently) toss the black/grey coin a thousand times and see 500 heads.
This seems like overwhelming evidence for thinking that the coin is very, very
nearly fair, and so seems like a spectacular justification for confining your
credence in B to some very, very narrow interval around 1/2. But, this sort of
learning is impossible if your credal state reflects every pdf on (0, 1). Nearly all
your committee members will have an initial pdf fc(•) that updates to a posterior
pdf fc(• | 500 black) that produces a credence for black that is closer to 1/2. That
sounds like learning! Unfortunately, two countervailing considerations entirely
nullify this effect. First, “pigheaded” pdfs that concentrate all their weight in
some proper subinterval (a, b) of (0, 1) will never assign B a credence outside
that interval: for them, c(B | 500 black) ∈ (a, b). If (a, b) is bounded away from
1/2, then there is no way for c(B | 500 black) to approach 1/2. Second, and in
some ways worse, for every non-pigheaded committee member fc who moves
her credence closer to 1/2 there will always be a more extreme member whose
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pdf fc ∗ is concentrated more heavily toward one end or the other of (0, 1)
and is such that fc ∗ (• | 500 black) = fc(•). As each “extremist” finds her views
tempered by the data, an even more radical extremist slides in from the wings
to take her place. So, while each non-pigheaded committee member becomes
more convinced that the coin is fair, your credal state as a whole remains
exactly where it was!
There are two ways for proponents of the imprecise model to respond to
this result. Purists will say that if you really know nothing about the black/white
coin’s bias, then you also really know nothing about how your opinions about
B should change in light of frequency data. For each 0 < δ < 1/2 you have
a committee member who feels that your credence for B should move exactly
δ probability units toward 1/2 given the data 500 heads. So, your views about
the evidential relevance of this data are maximally imprecise, which means that
your credence for B should remain imprecise as well even after taking the data
into account. You cannot learn anything in cases of pronounced ignorance
simply because a prerequisite for learning is to have prior views about how
potential data should alter your beliefs, but you have no determinate views on
these matters at all.
The alternative response involves taking a small step in the direction of
precision. One might think that the most pigheaded and extreme committee
members — those that place all their credal density on a proper subinterval
of (0, 1) or those that focus almost entirely on the ends of the interval —
represent positions of such fanatical overconfidence that they should be
discounted. Perhaps the right way to secure inductive learning is to sharpen
your credal state by (a) throwing out all the pigheaded committee members
and insisting that each c be based on a pdf that assigns some positive credence
to every event of the form a < β < b, and (b) silencing “extremist” elements by
insisting that each committee member assign a credence to B that falls within
some sharpened interval (c−, c+) with c− > 0 and c+ < 1. (Symmetry would
dictate c− = 1 − c+.) Inductive learning is then possible: the width of the
interval for c(B | 500 black) will be narrower than (c−, c+), and the narrower
the prior interval is the faster the posterior interval shrinks. (In a sense, the
amount of sharpening one is willing to tolerate can be seen as an indicator of
one’s natural inductive boldness.) The basic strategy generalizes to cases where
the objective chance of some event X lies in an arbitrary interval (a, b). Here,
sharpening involves starting with the set of all densities over (a, b), eliminating
the pigheaded ones, and then requiring that every pdf in the credal state to
generate a credence for X that falls within a subinterval of (a, b), so that more
extremist members, relative to the group norm, are eliminated. In keeping with
Symmetry, one might preserve balance by ensuring that each “left winger” with
c(X) = 1/2·(a + b) − ε who is ushered off is accompanied by a “right winger”
with c∗(X) = 1/2·(a + b) + ε, so that the interval’s midpoint is preserved.
While sharpening has some attractive features, purist defenders of impre-
cision will have difficulty detecting a coherent rationale for the strategy. Why
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banish extremists? Why not ditch moderates? There seems to be no reason based
in the evidence for doing one rather than the other. Likewise, what principled
reason is there to confine credences to one proper subinterval of (a, b) as
opposed to another? Whichever way you go, you end up acting as if you have
evidence that you do not actually possess. I will not try to adjudicate these
issues here, except to say (i) that my sympathies lie with the purists, but (ii)
the sharpening strategy (as we shall see) may play a role in practical decision
making even if it is defective as epistemology.
Commentary on 2I : Requiring each c ∈ C to be a probability forces graded
beliefs to have some nice normative properties. First, it entails that C’s
associated confidence ranking, defined by X .>. Y iff c(X) > c(Y ) for all c ∈ C
(and likewise for.>.), is a comparative probability. This means, for example,
that a person who is more confident in X than in Y is thereby committed,
whether she knows it or not, to being more confident in X v Z than in Y v Z
when Z is contrary to X and Y . Second, 2I guarantees that each X in 
has a coherent lower and upper credence. These are the lower and upper
bounds of the values that elements of C assign to X : C−(X) = inf{c(X):
c ∈ C} and C+(X) = sup{c(X): c ∈ C}. It follows from 2I that C−(X) ≤ 1 −
C−(∼X) = C+(X), and that C−(X v Y ) ≥ C−(X) + C−(Y ) when X and Y are
contraries. One can think of C−(X) and C+(X) is the lowest/highest probability
for X that the evidence permits, according to a conception of evidence on
which data tells for/against X to exactly the same degree it tells against/for
∼X . Upper and lower probabilities are useful, in part, because they reflect
limitations on a believer’s epistemic and practical commitments. To see how
imagine, as Bayesians often do, that a person with a sharp credence for X will
always set a “fair price” of c(X) utiles on a wager [u(X) = 1, u(∼X) = 0]
that pays one utile if X and nothing if ∼X . It is then possible to show that a
person with imprecise credences that satisfy 2I can avoid becoming the victim
of a “Dutch book” by having the policy of never paying more than C−(X)
utiles to buy the wager and never selling it for less than C+(X) utiles. In other
words, she can avoid accepting a series of wagers that are certain to leave worse
off in the aggregate merely by paying prices that all her “committee members”
regard as fair or advantageous.
Commentary on 3I . According to 3I, updating in light of data involves having
each “committee member” update on the data individually, and taking the
posterior to be the new, better informed committee. There is an alternative
model of updating, I have heard suggested, which simply eliminates those
probabilities in C that are incompatible with the data received. On this proposal,
if a person with credal state C learns D (and nothing else), then her post-
learning credal state is C ∩ D = {c(•) : c ∈ C and c(D) = 1}. So, rather
than reporting the new evidence to the committee and letting members modify
their opinions accordingly, members who did not anticipate the data are shown
the door and the rest, whose views do not change at all, constitute the new
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committee. This model seems to be based on a confusion between learning
that some event has occurred and learning that its prior objective chance of
occurring was 1.
To see this point, suppose you are facing two urns each of which contains
five black or grey balls. You know that there in one more black ball in urn1
than there is in urn2, but otherwise you know nothing else about either urn’s
contents. A coin will be tossed, and a ball will be drawn randomly from urn1
if heads and from urn2 if tails. You know that the coin is biased toward heads,
but for all you know the chances of a head coming up might be any number
in (1/2, 1]. Without knowing how the coin fell, you learn that a black ball was
drawn. How confident should you be that the coin landed heads? Suppose your
credal state C contains every probability function defined over the events 〈n〉 &
±Heads & ±Black such that c(Black | 〈n〉 & Heads) = n/5 and c(Black | 〈n〉 &
∼Heads) = n−1/5, where 〈n〉 means that Urn1 contains n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 5} black
balls. Learning Black is moderately informative about Heads on 3I’s model:
Upon conditioning, each committee member raises her credence for Heads a
little bit, and CBlack ends up containing credence functions whose values for
Heads cover the smaller interval (5/9, 1]. For “show ‘em the door” updating,
however, learning Black is maximally informative about the coin toss. Since the
only credence in C for which c(Black) = 1 also has c(Heads) = 1 and c(〈5〉) =
1, learning that ball was black licenses the conclusion that the coin surely came
up heads, clearly the wrong answer. Of course, this would be the right answer
if you had learned that the initial (pre-draw) chance of Black was one, but this
is not what you learned.
Commentary on 4I . 4I lays down a sufficient condition for imprecise preferences.
In the same way that each event in  has an upper and lower probability,
each prospect A that produces an outcomes of utility uA(Xn) across some
partition {X 1, X 2, . . . , XN} will have an upper and a lower expected utility,
with Exp+(A) = −Exp−(∼A). 4I says that a rational agent will definitely
prefer A to a payment of u < Exp−(A) utiles and definitely prefer a payment
u > Exp+(A) utiles to A. Questions about payments in the range between
Exp−(A) and Exp+(A) are left unresolved. More generally, if the credence
committee members unanimously agree that one prospect is better or worse
than another then 4I requires the agent to have that preference, but when there
is disagreement it is ambiguous what the agent should do. There is no consensus
among proponents of the imprecise model about what choices are permissible
or impermissible in the ambiguous region. We shall be discussing these issues
more fully below.
What Does the Imprecise Model Represent?
Before addressing objections to the imprecise model we should consider
another issue that divides its proponents. As with any attempt to represent
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some phenomenon mathematically, it is critical to figure out which aspects of
a representation reflect the reality being modeled and which are artifacts of the
formalism. In particular, we need to know which features of a believer’s credal
state actually convey facts about her beliefs. One view has it that the useful
information in C is exhausted once we know the upper and lower probabilities
that C associates with the propositions in . More formally, the view is this:
Lower Probability (LP). If credal states C and C∗ assign the same lower
(hence upper) probabilities to all events in , then C and C∗ encode
the same beliefs about .
Some, e.g., Henry Kyburg of [1983], have gone farther and advocated
jettisoning C altogether and thinking of the believer as having a single credence
function that assigns intervals, rather than sharp numbers, to propositions.
Others have suggested that following the slightly more general view:
PSET. If C and C∗ assign the same range of values to all events in , so
that the sets C(X) = {c(X) : c ∈ C} and C∗(X) = {c∗(X) : c∗ ∈ C∗}
are identical for all X ∈ , then C and C∗ encode the same beliefs
about .
White [2010, p. 173] seems to accept PSET, writing, “often we are just interested
in the spread of values in our [credal state] for a particular proposition. . . I
will speak of one’s credence in a proposition as being possibly a set of values.”
He also uses the notation C(X) = {c(X) : c ∈ C} and speaks of the credence
of an event when he clearly means the range of its probabilities in C.
Unfortunately for LP and PSET, there are cases in which C and C∗ clearly
capture distinct beliefs despite generating identical sets of probabilities for all
X ∈ . Here is an example:
Three-sided Die. Suppose C and C∗ are defined on a partition {X , Y , Z}
corresponding to the result of a roll of a three sided-die. Let C contain all
credence functions defined on {X , Y , Z} such that c(Z) ≥ 1/2, and let C∗ be the
subset of C whose members also satisfy c(X) = c(Y ).
It is easy to show that C and C∗ generate the same range of probabilities for
all Boolean combinations of {X , Y , Z}, and so LP and PSET deem them
equivalent. But, they are surely different: the C∗-person believes everything the
C-person believes, but she also regards X and Y as equiprobable.
One can avoid this particular problem by focusing more broadly on the
ranges of expected values that credal states generate (as in Walley [1991]). These
expectations are associated with random variables of the form g(Xn) = an ∈
 with {X 1, X 2, . . . , XN} a partition from . As before, one can either focus
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on the upper and lower values of such expectations or on their entire ranges.
Taking the later approach yields:
ESET.11 If C and C∗ assign the same range of expected values to all ran-
dom variables defined on , so that the sets C(g) = {Expc(g) : c ∈ C}
and C∗(g) = {Expc ∗ (g) : c∗ ∈ C∗} are always identical, then C and C∗
encode the same beliefs about .
This avoids the Three-sided Die problem since C and C∗ assign different ranges
of expected values to the function 〈g(X) = 1, g(Y ) = −1, g(Z) = 0〉, viz., C(g) =
[−1/2, 1/2] and C∗(g) = 0.
Despite this success, there are still other cases in which C and C∗ capture
distinct beliefs despite generating identical expectations. Consider the following
example:
Complementarity. A black/grey coin will be tossed followed by a head/tail coin.
You and I know nothing about the either coin’s bias except that there is some
chance of all four outcomes. So, our credal states contain probability functions
that assign H and B every value in (0, 1). Compatible with our shared ignorance,
we have divergent opinions about the stochastic connection between the tosses.
You regard them as independent, i.e., you think the probability of seeing a
head on the second toss is the same whether black or grey comes up. So, every
probability in your credal state satisfies c(H |B) = c(H |∼B). In contrast, I
treat heads as complementary to black (my term), which means that I think the
probability of seeing a head after seeing black is the reverse of the probability of
seeing a head after seeing grey. So, every probability in my credal state satisfies
c(H |B) = c(∼H |∼B). Here is a picture of the situation, where the area of each
region corresponds to its probability:
Figure 1
The broken vertical and horizontal lines in each diagram vary independently,
and one can place them anywhere within the interior of the boxes and remain
within the relevant credal state. By moving lines up and down and left and right
it becomes easy to see that the range of probabilities for Boolean combinations
of the four events are the same in either picture: indeed, the range is always (0, 1)
296 / James M. Joyce
(except for T and ⊥). Likewise, if we assign a numerical value to each quadrant
and take expectations we can obtain any value in the proper span of the four
values using either picture. According to ESET, then, you and I have the same
beliefs. This manifestly wrong! You regard the product of the probabilities of H
& B and ∼H & ∼B as equal to the product of the probabilities of ∼H & B and
H & ∼B, while I see the ratio of the probability of H & B to that of ∼H & ∼B as
equal to the ratio of the probability of ∼H & B to that of H & ∼B (even though
neither of us assigns any of these four propositions any specific probability).
The moral here is that there is more to our doxastic attitudes than can
be represented by imprecise models that accept ESET, PSET or LP. An
adequate model of imprecise opinion should be able to capture the difference
between independence and complementarity,12 and the only way to do this is
by recognizing that certain sorts of beliefs will only be revealed by functional
relationships that hold among the credence functions in one’s credal state,
relationship that are obscured if we focus only on the sets of probabilities
assigned to propositions or the sets of values assigned to random variables.
Here are some of the functional relationships I have in mind:
• X 1, X 2, . . . ,XN are probabilistic contraries: n c(Xn) = constant < N
for all c ∈ C.
• X 1, X 2, . . . ,XN are probabilistic subcontraries: n c(Xn) = constant > 0
for all c ∈ C.
• X is determinately more probable than Y: c(X) > c(Y ) for all c ∈ C.
• X and Y are stochastically independent: c(X|Y ) = c(X | ∼Y ) for all
c ∈ C.
• X is complementary to Y : c(X|Y ) = c(∼X | ∼Y ) for all c ∈ C.
These are all legitimate epistemic attitudes, and while some can be captured
within a framework that accepts ESET the only way to represent them all is
by allowing C to encode facts about beliefs that go well beyond that is found
in sets of probability values and expectations.
Epistemological Objections to the Imprecise Model
White [2010] seeks to undermine the idea of imprecise credences using
a series of examples in which the imprecise model seems to fail from an
epistemological perspective. Here is perhaps the most interesting (slightly
retold):
Coin Game. I have a fair coin with heads on one side and tails on the other, and
a coin of entirely unknown bias that is black on one side and grey on the other.
Since you know the head/tail coin is fair, each c in your credal state will satisfy
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c(H) = 1/2, where H says that the coin comes up heads on its next toss. Since
you know nothing about the black/grey coin the imprecise interpretation says
that there will be a c in your credal state with c(B) = x for every 0 < x < 1. I
will toss the coins, independently, and observe the results without showing them
to you. I will then tell you something about how the outcomes are correlated by
reporting either “H ≡ B” (if I see head and black or tail and grey), or “H ≡
∼B” (if I see head and grey or tail and black). Since the head/tail coin is fair
and tosses are independent, you anticipate these reports with equal probability:
c(H ≡ B) = c(H ≡ ∼B) = 1/2 for all c ∈ C. The case in which you learn H ≡ B
can be pictured as follows:
Figure 2
The horizontal line separating heads and tails in the left-hand diagram is
accurately placed: it reflects your initial knowledge that the head/tail coin is
fair. We will discuss the status of the vertical line separating black and grey
shortly. White’s question is this: How confident should you be in H after you
hear me say “H ≡ B”?
Some things are obvious. First, learning H ≡ B shifts you from C to
CH≡B = {c(•|H ≡ B): c ∈ C}, which means that your posterior beliefs about
H and B will be identical since the laws of probability require c(H |H ≡ B) =
c(B |H ≡ B) for all c ∈ C. Second, since the tosses are independent and c(H) =
1/2 it follows that c(B |H ≡ B) = c(H)·c(B)/[c(H)·c(B) + c(∼H)·c(∼B)] =
c(B).13 Thus, we have
♣ For every c ∈ C,
◦ the credence that c assigns to B upon learning H ≡ B is identical to
the prior credence that c assigns to B, c(B |H ≡ B) = c(B);
◦ the credence that c assigns to H upon learning H ≡ B is identical to
the credence c assigns to B upon learning H ≡ B, c(H |H ≡ B) =
c(B |H ≡ B).
This is surprising! Learning that H and B are perfectly correlated provides you
with no relevant evidence about B, but it forces you to conform your beliefs
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about the outcome of the head/tail toss (about which you know a lot) to your
prior beliefs about B (about which you know nothing).
People have three sorts of reactions to Coin Game, each reflecting a
different interpretation of the vertical line in FIGURE 2. A precise Bayesian
of the objectivist school will say that the example only seems puzzling because
the figure is so misleadingly drawn. The vertical line should be in the center to
indicate that you should invoke POI and settle on a determinate probability of
1/2 for B. Then, the identities in ♣ are exactly what one would expect, since your
credences about H and B (and their logical combinations) are exactly as they
would be if you took the black/grey coin to be fair: c(H & B) = c(H & ∼B)
= c(∼H & B) = c(∼H & ∼B) = 1/4.
Precise subjectivist Bayesians also find nothing puzzling in White’s example.
They see the vertical line in FIGURE 2 as a personal choice to be made on the
basis of inductive hunches, gut feelings, or whatever. While rationality requires
you to draw a single vertical line at some point along the horizontal axis
no particular point is mandated. Once c(B) has a definite value, however, the
identity c(B |H ≡ B) = c(B) has a compelling rationale. Bayes’ Theorem entails
that learning H ≡ B can only alter the evidence for or against B if there is a
difference between H ≡ B’s probability given B and its probability given ∼B.
But, since you take heads and tails to be equiprobable and since you see the
tosses as independent, there is no difference. If I tell you black came up, your
credence for H ≡ B is just your credence for heads. If I tell you grey came
up, your credence for H ≡ B is just your credence for tails. Either way, the
credence is 1/2, which means that the biconditional’s truth or falsity is irrelevant
to B’s probability. It should also be clear why your credence for heads should
shift so as to coincide with your sharp credence for black. It helps to think
sequentially: suppose that you first learn H ≡ B, and so become convinced that
H and B are equiprobable. If you then discover that B’s probability (in light of
the correlation) is precisely p, you thereby come to know that H’s probability
is p as well. If, conditional on H ≡ B, you have a precise credence for B then
you should have the same precise credence for H.
While Coin Game poses no problems when credences are precise, it has
disconcerting consequences for imprecise models. Suppose your credal state
C is a set of probabilities whose values for B range over all of (0, 1). This
amounts to treating the vertical line in FIGURE 2 as an arbitrary exemplar of
some infinite family of lines which, in the aggregate, represents your imprecise
state of confidence. If the line can be drawn anywhere, then the ♣-identities
entail that your posterior CH ≡B will contain functions whose values for both
B and H range over all of (0, 1). For B this is no surprise. Since you started
with imprecise beliefs about B, and since (as explained above) learning H ≡ B
when c(H) = 1/2 provides no relevant evidence about B, it stands to reason
that you should wind up imprecise about B. What is surprising is that your
credence for H goes from being sharply 1/2 in C to being spread over the whole
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of (0, 1) in CH ≡B! This probabilistic dilation has been studied by Seidenfeld and
Wasserman [1993]. It is entirely unavoidable on any view that allows imprecise
probabilities.
White sees this as a serious problem for the imprecise model. In addition
to having deep conceptual problems, he argues, dilation is the wrong response
to Coin Game. The right response, he feels, lies in recognizing that
• Neither H ≡ B nor ∼H ≡ B is the least bit are evidentially relevant to
H when you are entirely ignorant about B.14
• Given this, you should retain a determinate credence of 1/2 for heads
upon learning H ≡ B, thereby keeping your credence for H aligned with
its know objective chance.
When coupled with the ♣-identities this requires your prior credence for B to
be 1/2, a result that White and others who endorse POI are happy to accept.
I shall argue, to the contrary, that dilation is the only proper response the
imprecise evidence that you receive in Coin Game. My main claims will be:
◦ Both H ≡ B nor ∼H ≡ B are highly evidentially relevant to H even when
you are entirely ignorant about B. It only seems otherwise because their
evidential impact on H’s probability is indeterminate, both in magnitude
and direction.
◦ Given this, it would be wrong to retain a credence of 1/2 for H upon
leaning H ≡ B or ∼H ≡ B. Instead, you should have an indeterminate
credence for H that reflects the indeterminate evidential import of your
new evidence.
Let me start by explaining where White’s arguments go wrong, since this will
teach us some surprising things about the resources of the imprecise model.
White first challenges the idea that H ≡ B can provide evidence about H.
He recognizes that if you have evidence about B then you may have to revise your
credence in H upon learning H ≡ B. For instance, if you know the black/grey
coin has bias β toward black then your credence for H must change from 1/2 to
β upon learning H ≡ B. In the terminology of Lewis (1980), knowledge of β
makes the information H ≡ B inadmissible with respect to head/tail coin toss:
it is direct evidence about the toss’s outcome which does not alter your views
about the coin’s fairness. Possession of inadmissible information undermines
the chance-to-credence link enshrined in the Principal Principle.
(PP) Your current credence for X should coincide with your current expec-
tation of X ’s time-t objective chances, so that c(X | chancet(X) = p)
= p whenever c(chancet(X) = p) > 0.
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As Lewis recognized, PP only holds subject to the proviso that you do not
possess any information that is inadmissible with respect to X’s time-t chances.15
Such information, being directly about X ’s outcome (or later chances) makes
chancet(X) = p insufficient, all on its own, to justify a credence assignment of
c(X) = p. As everyone agrees, this would be your situation if you initially knew
that the black/grey coin had a specific bias β and later came to learn H ≡ B.
In Coin Game, however, you know nothing about the black/grey coin’s
bias. This entirely changes the situation, according to White. He argues as
follows (p. 177–178):
• You started out knowing that the head/tail coin was fair.
• “You haven’t a clue whether as to whether B”.
• If “you haven’t a clue whether as to whether B,” then learning H ≡ B
provides “nothing to suggest that the coin landed heads or that it landed
tails.”
• Hence, you should “just ignore this useless bit of information and keep
your credence in heads at 1/2,” aligned with the known initial objective
chances.
The key move is the third step, which implies that H ≡ B is admissible when
you know nothing about B’s initial (t = 0) chances. Though White is not explicit
about why he thinks that H ≡ B “suggests nothing” about H in this situation,
his view does have a lot of intuitive force. If there is any inadmissible evidence
in H ≡ B it is sure hard to spot since, in the absence of evidence about B or
∼B, H ≡ B seems to be entirely uninformative about H. How can you learn
anything about an event by discovering how it correlates with another event
that you know nothing about?
This plausible sounding reasoning hinges on a subtle equivocation. As
we have seen, there are two ways in which one event can be “uninformative
about” another: the two might be stochastically independent or it might be in
an “unknown interaction” situation. Regarding H ≡ B and H as independent
in Coin Game means having a credal state in which c(H |H ≡ B) = c(H) =
c(B) = 1/2 holds everywhere. While proponents of POI will find this congenial,
friends of imprecise probabilities will rightly protest that there is no justification
for treating the events as independent. You have no evidence to suggest anything
about the relevance of H ≡ B to H. For all you know, the black/grey coin
might be strongly biased toward black, in which case H ≡ B tells heavily in
favor of H. It might be strongly biased toward grey, in which case H ≡ B
tells heavily against H. Or, it might have an intermediate bias, and so be of
intermediate evidential significance for H. Behaving as if these two events are
independent amounts to pulling a statistical correlation out of thin air! The
fact is that your evidence leaves the relationship between c(H |H ≡ B) and
c(H) entirely open.
A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making / 301
This helps to explain why the inadmissible information is so difficult to
spot. When C’s values for c(H |H ≡ B) span all of (0, 1), the “committee
members” all agree that H ≡ B is inadmissible with respect to chance0(H),
but disagree about how much and in which direction this data should alter H’s
probability. To see why, it helps to remind oneself that H ≡ B is direct evidence
about the outcome of the head/tail toss. (Remember, I see how the coins fall
before making my report.) This is reflected in your credal state by the following
identities, which hold all across C when x = 1/2:
($) c(chance0(H) = x |H ≡ B) = c(chance0(H) = x) = 1
c(H | chance0(H) = x & H ≡ B) = c(H |H ≡ B).
In fact, something stronger is true. Even if we alter the example, so that you
start out uncertain about the head/tail coin’s bias, ($) will still hold whenever
c(chance0(H) = x) > 0. On this matter your credal committee speaks with one
voice: H ≡ B is inadmissible with respect to any initial chance assignment for
H, and the initial chance of heads ceases to be of evidential consequence once
H ≡ B becomes known. This unanimity tends to be obscured, however, by the
members’s disparate views about the impact of H ≡ B on H (owing to their
divergent views about B). Since c(H |H ≡ B) = c(B) holds across C, those with
unconditional probabilities for B above 1/2 will say that learning H ≡ B raises
H’s probability; those with unconditional probabilities for B below 1/2 will say
that H ≡ B lowers H’s probability; those with c(B) = 1/2 will say that H’s
probability remains fixed.16 Just as it is easy to confuse unknown interaction
with stochastic independence, it is easy to confuse ambiguity in evidential
impact with lack of evidential impact. This is exactly what White seems to
have done, misclassifying inadmissible information of (maximally) imprecise
evidential significance as admissible information of no evidential significance at
all. Once one appreciates that H ≡ B is inadmissible, however, it becomes more
plausible that H’s credence should dilate in response to H ≡ B’s ambiguous
message. This consideration is not decisive (see next paragraph), but what is
clear is that the initial fairness of the head/tail coin cannot justify a posterior
credence of 1/2 all of its own, as White’s argument suggests.
Even if H ≡ B does trump your knowledge of H’s initial chance, it does not
automatically follow that it is evidentially relevant to H. Perhaps the proper
response to data of maximally ambiguous evidential import is to treat it as
having no impact at all. This is what one would think if, consonant with
POI, one felt that each c ∈ C is “cancelled out” by a complementary c∗
such that c∗(H |H ≡ B) = 1 − c(H |H ≡ B), so that silence results when
committee members scream equally loudly in favor of contrary conclusions.
A plausible seeming argument for this view appeals to the likelihood principle,
which, for current purposes, says that H ≡ B can only be evidence for H if
there is some difference between H ≡ B’s probability conditional on H and its
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probability conditional on ∼H. For a sharp credence function c, this means
that, by c’s lights, H ≡ B is only evidence for or against H if c(H ≡ B |H) =
c(H ≡ B |∼H). The imprecise analogue is the following:
Likelihood. According to an imprecise credal state C, H ≡ B is evidentially
relevant to H if and only if CH and C∼H encode different beliefs about H ≡ B.
If we accept this it looks like the game us up. CH and C∼H both contain
credence functions that assign H ≡ B every probability in (0, 1) and so, one
might argue, they encode the same beliefs about H ≡ B. It then follows from
Likelihood (which we should accept) that H ≡ B is not evidence for or against
H.
The flaw in this reasoning lies in its assumption that credal states encode
the same beliefs about an event when they assign the same range of values
to that event, in particular that CH and C∼H encode the same beliefs about
H ≡ B because CH (H ≡ B) = C∼H (H ≡ B) = (0, 1). This is just ESET,
a view we have already rejected. In fact, from C’s perspective, CH and C∼H
encode complementary beliefs about H ≡ B, even though each is maximally
imprecise about its probability. C’s committee members agree that c(H ≡ B |H)
= 1 – c(H ≡ B |∼H), and so are unanimous in thinking that learning H
will increase/decrease H ≡ B’s probability to the same degree that learning
∼H will decrease/increase its probability (while disagreeing entirely about the
magnitude and direction of these changes). Your credal attitudes toward H ≡ B
upon learning H and upon learning ∼H are thus are mirror images of one
another, equally imprecise but flipped right to left. While this difference in
orientation does not show up in the range of credence values for H ≡ B, it
appears in other ways. For example, all committee members will agree that
the following wagers have the same expected utility for any values of x1, x2,
y1, y2:
Table 1
(H ≡ B) & H (H ≡ ∼B) & H (H ≡ B) & ∼H (H ≡ ∼B) & ∼H
Bet-1 $x1 $y1 $y2 $x2
Bet-2 $x2 $y2 $y1 $x1
This entails, among other things, that you are determinately indifferent between
(i) a conditional bet that pays a prize for H ≡ B and a penalty for H ≡ ∼B
when H holds and is called off when ∼H, and (ii) a conditional bet that pays
the same prize for H ≡ ∼B and the same penalty for H ≡ B when ∼H holds
and is called off in when H.
Given the complementary nature of your beliefs, Likelihood says that, from
C’s perspective, H ≡ B is evidence about H. It only seems otherwise because
it is so easy to confuse complementarity with independence. If H ≡ B and H
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where independent, then c(B) = 1/2 would hold all across C, and CH and C∼H
would encode the same beliefs about H ≡ B. Here, however, we do not have
independence of precise credences, but complementarity of imprecise credences.
H ≡ B is determinately relevant to H in virtue of the complementarity, but
the magnitude and direction of its effect on H’s probability is indeterminate
because of the imprecision.
One can put the point differently by starting not from Likelihood, but
from the (equivalent) principle:
Conditionality. According to C, H ≡ B is evidentially relevant to H if and only
if CH ≡B and CH ≡∼B encode different beliefs about H.
CH ≡B(H) and CH ≡∼B(H) span the whole of (0, 1), which can make it seem
as if they encode the same beliefs about H. Again, however, the beliefs are
complementary: every committee member agrees that c(H |H ≡ B) = 1 −
c(H |H ≡ ∼B). So, far from being the same, from your prior perspective,
your beliefs about H upon learning H ≡ ∼B are antithetical to your beliefs
about H upon learning H ≡ ∼B. Learning H ≡ B puts you in a position
in which your uncertainty about H versus ∼H is uncertainty about H & B
versus ∼H & ∼B. Learning H ≡ ∼B puts you in a position in which your
uncertainty about H versus ∼H is uncertainty about H & ∼B versus ∼H & B.
These are determinately different states because H & B and H & ∼B are
contraries, and ∼H & B and ∼H & ∼B are contraries. So, according to C,
your opinions about H will be determinately different depending on whether
you learn H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B, but this difference will not show up in the range
of probabilities you assign to H in the two situations. Again, this means that
H ≡ B is determinately relevant to H, but that the magnitude and direction of
its effect on H’s probability is indeterminate.
This observation allows us to dispatch a number of White’s other objections
to the imprecise model. Consider the objection he calls “Reflection”. White
writes that, “according to the [imprecise] proposal you know in advance that
once you [hear my report] you will rationally dilate your credence in heads. So,
you ought to just dilate it now before the coin[s] even land. . . which is absurd.”
(p. 178) Here White is claiming that combining dilation with
Reflection (van Fraassen [1984]). If you know you will undergo a veridical
learning experience in which you discover H ≡ B’s truth-value (and nothing
else), and if you can now identify a single belief state for H that you will inhabit
whatever you learn about H ≡ B, then you should be inhabiting that belief state
already.
entails the manifestly incorrect conclusion that your initial credence for H must
be spread over (0, 1). As in White’s first argument, the crucial unstated premise
is that you end up in the same maximally imprecise belief state relative to H
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whether you learn H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B. But, we have already seen that this
is not the case. From the perspective of your prior, the beliefs about H you
will come to have upon learning H ≡ B are complementary to the beliefs you
will have upon learning H ≡ ∼B. There is, in fact, no single belief state for
H that you will inhabit whatever you learn about H ≡ B. You will inhabit
an imprecise state either way, but these states will differ depending on what
you learn. Reflection does not tell you to have imprecise beliefs now if you
know that you will have imprecise beliefs in the future. Rather, it says that
your current credence for H should coincide with your current expectation of
your future credence for H. But, crucially, an expectation of future imprecise
states need not itself be imprecise. That’s exactly what happens here: all C’s
committee members agree that H’s expected future credence is precisely 1/2! So,
contra White, the combination of Relfection and imprecise model yields exactly
the right answer.
Another of White’s objections to dilation concerns what happens in a
variant of Coin Game:
Many Coins. Coin Game is repeated a large number of times with the same fair
head/tail coin and different black/grey coins of entirely unknown biases. After
each trial you are told how the coins came up and are allowed to update your
expectations for future trials in light of this information. Suppose you play the
game N − 1 times for some large N (say, around ten thousand), and that, as one
would expect from a fair coin, the frequency of heads has settled down some
tiny distance from 1/2. How should you modify your credence for HN , the event
of a head coming up on the Nth trial, when you learn HN ≡ BN?
The imprecise model requires your credence for HN to go from precisely 1/2
to entirely imprecise, so that your credal state after the first N–1 trials has
values for c(HN |HN ≡ BN) that span (0, 1). But, White writes, “it will be
hard not to notice after a while that about half the time when you are in
the [imprecise] state concerning HN the coin does land heads. And it will be
hard not to infer inductively that it will continue to be the case that about half
the occasions in this scenario in which you have seen the coin land and your
credence is C(HN) = (0, 1), HN is true.” (p. 180, with minor changes) So, in
White’s picture, observation and good inductive reasoning should, eventually,
lead you to a credal state in which your probability for heads remains at 1/2, or
thereabouts, even after you learn of how the head/tail and black/grey outcomes
are correlated.
Again, the argument goes awry by assuming that credal states which assign
the same range of credences for an event reflect the same opinions about that
event. To make the error explicit, let’s pause to consider an aspect of Many
Coins that might go unnoticed. It is essential to the example that, upon learning
HN ≡ BN or HN ≡ ∼BN , your credence for HN goes from being precisely 1/2
to being spread across (0, 1). This requires your initial probability to be such
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that, given any data stream D = (±H 1 & ±B1) &. . .& (±HN −1 & ±BN −1),
one has
(∗) For all c ∈ C, c(HN |D) = 1/2 and c(HN |D & (HN ≡ ±BN)) =
c(BN |D).
(∗∗) For all b ∈ (0, 1) there is a c ∈ C with c(BN |D) = b.
(∗∗) means that your initial opinions must prevent you from learning anything
inductively about the black/grey coin’s bias on trial N on the basis of
information about earlier trials. This is a strange a situation. We are accustomed
to thinking of frequency data as yielding useful information about underlying
chance processes, but the first N − 1 trials are entirely irrelevant to how the
black/grey coin will fall on the Nth trial.
This strangeness helps to explain why we are so easily misled into thinking,
as White does, that inductive inference should be possible here. White wants to
argue this way:
• On each trial k < N you (a) knew the head/tail coin was objectively fair,
and (b) received an item of maximally imprecise information about the
relationship between Hk and Bk.
• In the first N − 1 trials you saw heads come up about N−1/2 times.
• Your situation in trial N is similar to your situations in the earlier trials
since you (a′) know that the head/tail coin is objectively fair, and (b′)
receive an item of maximally imprecise information about the relationship
between HN and BN .
• So, since similar cases should receive similar inductive treatment, your
credence for HN should be about 1/2.
There are two flaws in this reasoning. First, (b) and (b
′
) are misleading since,
as we now know, you do not see Hk ≡ Bk and Hk ≡ ∼Bk as providing the
same information about the outcome of the kth toss. Indeed, it is consistent
with your evidence that the probability of Hk is high given Hk ≡ Bk and low
given Hk ≡ ∼Bk. So, the argument will only succeed if its second premised is
replaced by something stronger. You need to know not merely that heads came
up half the time, but also that there is no pattern in the data that relates the
appearance of heads with reports of Hk ≡ Bk or Hk ≡ ∼Bk. If, say, heads
came up seventy percent of the time when Hk ≡ Bk was announced and thirty
percent of the time when Hk ≡ ∼Bk was announced, then heads would still
appear about half the time overall, but it would be crazy to use 1/2 as your
credence for HN : 7/10 or 3/10 would be better choices, depending what you
learn. To fix the argument we must assume that, relative to the data D you
receive, your beliefs about HN will be (nearly) the same whether you condition
on D & (HN ≡ BN) or D & (HN ≡ ∼BN). But, since HN ≡ BN and HN ≡
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∼BN are complementary when there is any spread in BN ’s credence values, this
requires BN to have a (nearly) sharp credence given the data, so that c(Bn |D) =
c∗(Bn |D) holds (approximately) for all c, c∗ ∈ C. But, (∗∗) precludes this! The
example presupposes both that you start out with an entirely imprecise credence
for BN and that the data you receive on the first N − 1 trials does not affect
your beliefs about BN , in particular, that it does not alter the fact that C’s
values for c(BN |D) range across all of (0, 1).
This brings the argument’s other flaw into the open. Ex hypothesi, you
reject any connection between what happens on the first N − 1 tosses of the
black/grey coins and what happens on the Nth toss. The similarity claim in
the third premise is then undermined. Your evidential situation upon learning
HN ≡ BN or HN ≡ ∼BN is unrelated, in any inductively significant way, to
earlier situations in which you learned of a correlation between the outcomes
of the two tosses. You see every trial as a whole new experiment, unrelated to
the previous, and each is just the original Coin Game. It only seems otherwise
because it is so easy to slip into thinking that the Hk ≡ Bk and Hk ≡ ∼Bk
all leave you in the same evidential state. In fact, from your perspective, the
items of information you receive in different trials have nothing to do with one
another, and within each trial Hk ≡ Bk and Hk ≡ ∼Bk form a complementary
pair. In such a situation dilation is the right response to the evidence you
receive!
White offers a variant of Many Coins, which some people find more
convincing.
Many Coins-II . Coin Game is repeated one million times with the same fair
head/tail coin and different black/grey coins. You are not shown the outcomes,
and the true member of each Hk ≡ Bk or Hk ≡ ∼Bk pair is written down on a
piece of paper which is temporarily kept hidden from you. You are told, however,
that each black/grey coin has a bias toward black between 0.4 and 0.6, and that
the tosses are independent. Consider the proposition “half-heads” which says
that between 450,000 and 550,000 heads came up. Before you are shown the
paper your credence for half-heads is astronomically close to one. What should
it be afterward?
As White points out, the imprecise model entails that your credence for half-
heads will dilate from being as close to 1 as anyone can imagine to being spread
out over almost the whole of (0, 1). This happens because, upon learning a
truth T = (H 1 ≡ ±B1) &. . .& (H 1000000 ≡ ±B1000000), members of your credal
committee who placed most of their credal density for B between 0.40 and
0.41 or between 0.59 and 0.60 will find half-heads wildly improbable, whereas
members whose densities are focused around the middle of the interval will
assign it a probability very close to one.
This counterintuitive result seems to reflect badly on the imprecise model.
However, it is intuition, not the model, that has it wrong. The idea that half-
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heads should be highly probable derives from our natural tendency to think
of coin tossing as a Bernoulli process in which all tosses are independent
and have the same chance of producing success. These two features of the
situation ensure that the frequencies of various possible outcomes are likely to
match their objective chances in the long run. This is exactly how you should
think of the heads/tails trials before you learn T. But, learning T destroys the
basis for the Bernoulli-process-hence-frequency-converges-to-chance reasoning
by destroying a crucial feature of your epistemic situation: when you learn T you
can no longer legitimately treat the head/tail tosses as independent trials! T is
a tremendously informative statement that establishes an individual correlation
between each of the million head/tail tosses and a million independent events,
albeit events whose probabilities are entirely unknown. After learning of all
these correlations, you can no longer think of the different head/tail trials
as independent any more than you could if learned that, for each k, a head
came up on the kth toss exactly if the kth name in the Chicago telephone
directory ends in a “g” (which would make half-heads pretty unlikely). The
only difference between the cases is that, owing to your maximally imprecise
knowledge of the chances of the various Bk, you are unable to replace
the independence assumption with any even moderately definite alternative.
Learning T, in other words, leaves you in a state of “unknown interaction” —
you know nothing about the statistical relationship between the various
head/tail outcomes. Though, as we have seen, it easy to mistake unknown
interaction with stochastic independence, they are entirely different animals. In
general, the right response to unknown interaction is dilation. In this case, that
means that your credence for half-heads should be spread out over all of (0, 1).
To think otherwise is to pretend that you have evidence of independence that
you do not really possess.
Dilation Everywhere?
Another line of objection found in White [2010, p. 183], can be illustrated
by the following example (slightly retold):17
Bonbons. You have just received a box of bonbons from Tic-Tac-Toe Chocolatiers
(a company you know nothing about). It says on the top that the box contains
nine chocolate-covered bonbons, eight of which have cherry fillings and one with
caramel filling. You draw a chocolate at random. Since you like cherry a lot and
mildly dislike caramel, 8:1 odds seems like a good bet, indeed anything better
than 2:7 seems worth it. Just as you are about to pop the candy into your mouth
you notice that it marked with an X. “I get it,” you think, “Tic-Tac-Toe — they
mark their candies with X s and Os!” But, it then occurs to you that you know
nothing about how the company marks its candies. It might put Xs on cherry
and Os on caramel, Os on cherry and Xs on caramel, or it might mix Xs and Os
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up in any random way. It might even be that the whole box is Xs. Should you
eat the bonbon?
White thinks it obvious that you should eat the bonbon. Merely reflecting on
the filling/marking relationship should not alter your probabilities a bit, he
thinks. Since the only way to achieve this is by investing equal credence in
cherry conditional on X and cherry conditional on O, White maintains that
you have no option but to apply POI subject to this constraint.
In contrast, proponents of imprecision are forced into the seemingly absurd
position of saying that, once you see the X, your credence for cherry dilates from
8/9 to range over [0, 1]. Since you know nothing about the way Xs and Os are
assigned, your credal state will contain committee members with values of λ =
c(cherry ≡ X) that cover [0, 1], and this leaves you with values of c(cherry |X) =
8λ/1+7λ that cover [0, 1] as well. Upon seeing X you cannot assign cherry any
determinate probability at all! But, White argues (pp. 183–184),
this is just not the way we think about such matters. And it’s not just about
chocolates. We are constantly faced with the possibility of correlations between
attributes about which we know nothing. If we were not committed to certain
credences in accordance with POI then our credences would be mushy all over
the place in implausible ways.
So, the worry is that countenancing dilation in Bonbons will force us to accept it
everywhere. Indeed, no matter how the bonbon looks, if we can imagine it looking
another way then we can wonder how looks and flavor are correlated. When
we are entirely without information on the topic, dilation ensues. Information
about the objective chance of an event thus seems irrelevant as soon as we
learn any trivial thing about it!
Proponents of imprecise probabilities have to bite the bonbon here, but it
doesn’t taste so bad! The first thing to notice is that it is rare for us to face
a problem like this without having some inkling about how the properties in
question are related. Our prior knowledge of the causal structure of the world
usually provides us a pretty good sense of when we need to pay attention to
some potential correlation and when we don’t. (“The bonbon has a little nick on
the side: that’s an accident. It has a red dot on top: that may mean something.”)
So, the prospects for a catastrophic metastasis of dilation may not be as dire as
White makes them seem. We are not “faced with the possibility of correlations
between attributes about which we know nothing” all that frequently.
Still, we cannot rely on background knowledge to eradicate the problem
entirely. I suspect that most of us, knowing what we know about candy makers,
will think the X-to-cherry relationship is likely to be either perfect correlation
(cherry ≡ X), perfect anti-correlation (cherry ≡ O), or stochastic independence.
I also suspect, however, that few of us have any clue about which of the three
it is. This uncertainty suffices to produce the maximal dilation.
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One way out (a council of desperation?) is to embrace the sharpening
strategy discussed earlier. Many people are averse to uncertainty, and become
uncomfortable when they cannot associate definite probabilities with events,
especially when there are choices to be made. To avoid the uncertainty, and
resolve decisions, such a person might adopt policies that lead to fairly sharp,
stable beliefs even when her evidence is thin or absent. I do not think there is
any question that, as a psychological matter, people often do exactly this. To
avoid the discomfort associated with “being at sea,” they banish uncertainty
and adopt more precise opinions than are strictly required by their evidence.
They reason, for example, that events are likely to be independent when no
evidence suggests a correlation (thereby ignoring the fact that no evidence
suggests independence either). Indeed, much of the intuitive appeal of belief-
forming strategies like POI is that they lead to sharp, settled states of belief
(and seem to have some underlying epistemological motivation).
One need not go as far as POI, however, to reap the benefits of precision.
In Bonbon, if you are mainly concerned with the question of whether or not
to eat the chocolate, you might merely banish the more extreme extremists by
confining your credence for cherry ≡ X to the interval (0.05, 0.95), thereby
eliminating committee members who are too distant from independence. The
initial 8:1 odds in favor of cherry then make themselves felt by ensuring that
only those committee members who regard cherry ≡ X as highly unlikely
(<1/29) will recommend against eating. So, by adopting this rather minimal
sharpening, you get a definite answer: Eat! Notice also that if, impressed
by the symmetry of your ignorance, you sharpen only to credal states with
c(cherry ≡ X) values in some symmetric interval around 1/2, then eating is
never definitively prohibited and is often mandated. There are sharpenings
that leave it indeterminate whether you should eat or not eat, sharpenings
that definitely advocate eating, but no symmetric sharpening determinately
recommends against eating. Impressed by this, a hungry chocolate-cherry lover
might find it appealing to do a little sharpening.
Despite its psychological advantages, from a purely epistemic point of
view, sharpening seems ad hoc. If you really know nothing about how Xs and
Os correlate with flavors, then you really cannot say whether the X you see
is a positive, neutral, or negative indicator of cherry filling, and so you really
don’t know whether it should lead you to alter your opinions, or in which
direction, or by how much. The trivial nature of the case tends to obscure
the true level of your ignorance, but increasing the stakes makes dilation more
plausible. Consider, for example, the following:
Crime & Punishment. You have been (unjustly) convicted of a crime in a foreign
land. The standard prison sentence is ten years, but the judge offers you an
option. She presents you with nine identical sealed envelopes, lying face-down
on a table. She tells you that eight contain pardons but one contains a twenty-
five year sentence. She has you designate an envelope at random, and tells you
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that you can open it and accept the sentence it contains or leave it unopened
and take the ten years. On the basis of the 8/9 probability of a pardon you are
inclined to open the envelope, but as you pick it up you notice that it is marked
with a big X on the other side. Would this give you pause?
Here the X does seem salient: is it an accident? does it mean the long sentence?
freedom? might all the envelopes have Xs? These questions matter, and I suspect
your inability to answer them will leave you at sea about what to think and
what to do. While it may not be obvious how to proceed, the one course that
seems definitely wrong is to blithely assume that the X is irrelevant, as White
and POI advocate. If you do open the letter, your reason surely will not be
that the X doesn’t signal anything about you fate. You know no such thing! At
best, you will be hoping, without evidence, either that the X is irrelevant to the
envelope’s contents or that it’s a positive sign. Your initial confidence, based on
knowledge of the chances, that the envelope is likely to hold a short sentence
is undermined by the appearance of X. However, since you do not know how
to interpret the X’s evidential relevance you do not know how your probability
should change. The proper result is dilation.
This answer disturbs people for two related reasons. First, in Bonbon and
Crime & Punishment, it seems like the initial chances should matter a lot even
after X is observed. Second, in both problems it seems clear what one should
do. In light of the 8:1 odds, what could possibly be said in favor of passing up
the chocolate or leaving the letter unopened? Both options seem wrong (though
the latter seems less wrong), even after you see X. The remedy for both worries
lies in recognizing that your knowledge of the initial 8:1 odds does remain,
albeit somewhat hidden, in your credal state, and that its presence can have a
significant effect on what you do. Let’s focus on Bonbon.
If the dilation picture is right, then your credal state contains committee
members who assign cherry every probability between zero and one, conditional
on X. But, focusing only on the range of values for c(cherry |X) leaves out
a crucial part of the story. One would have CX (cherry) = [0, 1] no matter
what the ratio of cherries to caramels (>0, <1) in the box. The fact that
cherry bonbons outnumber caramel 8:1 only shows up when we look at the
relationship between a committee member’s credence for cherry given X and
her estimate of the degree to which X tells for or against cherry. The important
thing for current purposes is that it will be true across your credal state that
($) c(cherry | X) = 8/9 · Rc(X, cherry),whereRc(X, cherry) = c(cherry&X)c(X) · c(cherry)
Rc is a well-known measure of evidential relevance18 that construes (incre-
mental) degree-of-support in terms of posterior-to-prior probability ratios.
Values of Rc(X, cherry) above/at/below 1 indicate that, by c’s reckoning, X
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provides positive/neutral/negative evidence for cherry, with values further from
1 indicating stronger levels of confirmation or disconfirmation. The 8/9 initial
probability for cherry is significant in ($) because it means that only committee
members who definitely regard X as evidence against cherry will assign cherry a
probability of less than 8/9 conditional on X. To get a probability less than 1/2
it takes an Rc-value below 9/16, which signals that X moderately disconfirms
cherry. For a c(cherry |X) below 2/9, Rc has to be less than 1/4, fairly significant
disconfirmation by this standard. So, more moderate committee members who
don’t rate X’s evidential impact all that highly will find themselves with high
credences for cherry when they learn X, e.g., those with 0.9 < Rc(X, cherry) <
1.1 will end up with 0.80 < c(cherry |X) < 0.97.
This can matter in decision making. An unfortunate effect of having
imprecise beliefs is that one is so often forced to make choices among prospects
of indeterminate value. Some of your credal committee members pronounce one
option better than another, others claim the reverse, which makes it unclear
what you should do. The solution is not to have precise beliefs: the precision
of your opinions should be tied to the nature of your evidence, not the choices
you face. What you need is some decision rule that will tell you how to make
choices when expected utility assessments are equivocal. Such rules should never
recommend one act over another when every member of your committee says
that the utility of the latter exceeds that of the former. Beyond that, there is
no consensus among proponents of the imprecise model about what features a
decision rule should have. I will say a little about this in the next section, but
two things are noteworthy in the current context. First, in contrast with precise
credences, where it is sometimes possible to infer a sharp subjective probability
for an event on the basis of a person’s choices, choices do not reveal imprecise
credences in such a direct way. If, say, a person chooses a bet that pays $1 if
X and $0 is ∼X over a straight payment of fifty cents, we cannot thereby infer
that she determinately believes that X is more likely than ∼X . All we can say,
without knowing more about her decision rule, is that some members of her
credal committee set c(X) ≥ 1/2 (i.e., we know only that her upper probability
for X is at least 1/2).
A second and related point is that, to facilitate choice, decision rules for
imprecise probabilities may appeal to considerations similar to those invoked
by precise Bayesians, but they will do so for pragmatic rather than epistemic
reasons. To take an extreme example, consider what Elga [2010, p. 6] calls the
midpoint rule, “according to which agents should evaluate bets according to the
midpoints of their probability intervals. . . Your evidence nails down the interval
and the midpoint rule says that you should evaluate bets in the same ways as
someone whose probability is in the exact center of the interval.” It is hard to
know how this rule is to be applied, since there can be a lot of “probability
intervals” in play and the center of one need not correlate to that of another.
But, let’s suppose that in Bonbon the relevant interval concerns your credence
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for cherry ≡ X. If so, then the midpoint rule has you bet as if c(cherry ≡ X) =
1/2 and c(cherry |X) = 7/8. You will behave exactly as White thinks you should!
Both Elga and White see the midpoint rule as a capitulation to the precise
model.
The midpoint rule robs unsharp probabilities of their point. . . if it is always
OK to have point-valued constraints on betting odds, there is no good reason
for objecting to point-valued probabilities in the first place. Bottom line: the
midpoint rule undermines the main motivation for [the imprecise] model. Elga
[2010, 6]
If the answer is that one should bet as if one has sharp credence we might
wonder. . . what the difference between sharp and mushy credence really consists
in. White [2010, 180]
I have heard similar sentiments from others, but am unmoved. Unlike a person
with sharp credences, when someone with imprecise credences invokes a rule
like midpoint her goal is not to choose an act that is determinately among
the best in light of her assessment of the evidence. Rather, since she feels
that the evidence leaves the matter open, and since she must do something,
she looks to the decision rule to settle matters that outrun her evidence. The
decision-making principles she applies are thus not epistemically motivated.
Instead, they are pragmatic principles, intended to facilitate choice, which often
explicitly involve acting in ways the agent knows are not mandated by her
beliefs. For example, using midpoint means ignoring aspects of your credal state
not reflected in credence intervals (like complementarities) and treating all your
committee members as equally reliable (by taking a straight average of their
views). A person might recognize that neither of these things are warranted by
their evidence, and still find them to be a useful way to make a decision. It
would be a mistake, therefore, to conflate the (typically much sharper) ‘pseudo-
beliefs’ that can be inferred from an agent’s choices with her actual beliefs,
which are based on her assessment of the evidence.
This way of thinking provides a new perspective on the sharpening idea.
There is no doubt that people making choices often act if there is less
imprecision in their opinions than there really is. Call this tendency pragmatic
sharpening to distinguish it from the epistemologically motivated sharpening
policies discussed on pp. 291–92. In general, pragmatic sharpening is a matter
of proceeding, for purposes of choosing actions, as if one’s credal state is a
proper subset C# of one’s actual credal state C. The choice of C# often involves
symmetry considerations. When C generates a credence interval (c−, c+) for an
event of interest X , people tend adopt a C# that generates c(X) values that fall
within some smaller interval with the same midpoint (c− + δ, c+ − δ). More
extreme committee members, relative to the group average, are eliminated, but
to preserve the committee’s balance in light of the identical evidential positions
of its members, each “left winger” with c(X) = 1/2·(c− + c+) − ε is ushered
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off accompanied by a complementary right winger with c∗(X) = 1/2·(c− + c+)
+ ε. This process can lead to definitive decisions even when it stops short of
midpoint, the limit of such strategies. As we have seen, a little sharpening can
provide a rationalization for eating the bonbon. It takes more sharpening to
rationalize opening the letter in Crime & Punishment. Here too it is true (in
virtue of the 8/9 chance of freedom) that there are symmetrical sharpenings
that recommend opening and symmetrical sharpenings that make no definite
recommendation, but there are no symmetrical sharpenings that recommend
leaving the envelope closed. The fact that it takes more sharpening to resolve
Crime & Punishment than in Bonbon is a symptom of the fact that the stakes
in the former decision are much higher. This also explains why we feel less sure
about the decision to open the envelope than the decision to eat the candy: the
more sharpening we have to do to resolve a choice problem the further we are
going beyond what we take to be our hard evidence, and so the more uncertain
we feel about the merits of our choice.
It must be reemphasized, however, that the rationalizations provided
by sharpening are entirely pragmatic in nature. Why banish the extremist
committee members? Why not eliminate moderates? Instead of moving from
(0, 1) to (0.1, 0.9), why not move to (0, 0.1) ∪ (0.9, 1)? There answer is that
there is no good epistemological reason for doing the one thing rather than the
other. Either way, you end up acting as if you have evidence you do not actually
possess. Still, “eliminate the extermists” does have the practical advantage of
making consensus easier to achieve while requiring less extreme changes in
one’s credal state, e.g., one cannot get a sharpening to recommend eating the
bonbon without violating Symmetry.
Sharpening is merely one strategy among many that a person might use
to make decisions in imprecise contexts. In all such strategies, the underlying
credences do not change.19 An agent merely acts, in a specific decision-making
context, as if she has more precise beliefs than she actually does. She might
sharpen in different ways in different contexts, so that different C#’s are used for
different decision problems.20 But, by adopting some strategy of this sort, she
is able to make choices even when her beliefs are too imprecise to definitively
recommend any utility maximizing action.
Do Imprecise Probabilities lead to Absurd Decisions?
White [2010] and Elga [2010] allege that the imprecise model has absurd
implications for decision making. In particular, they both maintain that the
most plausible decision theories for imprecise probabilities will allow agent’s to
pass up objectively advantageous bets or to accept objectively disadvantageous
bets. The question, as White sees it, is this: “if your credence in X is [x, y], at
what odds should you bet?” He considers two “common” answers:21
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Liberal. It is mandatory to take bets that uniquely maximize expected utility for
all c ∈ C. It is permissible to take any set of bets that maximizes expected utility
relative to some c ∈ C.
Conservative. It is mandatory to take bets that uniquely maximize expected utility
for all c ∈ C. It is impermissible to take any bet that fails to maximize expected
utility for all c  C.
I regard Conservative as incoherent. As we have seen, in many decisions there
are no options that maximize expected utility across c ∈ C, but one must still
choose. In my view, any reasonable decision rule for imprecise probabilities
must designate at least one act on an agent’s total menu of possible options
as permissible. If the agent is constrained to choose off of the menu, then the
rule cannot say that every choice she might make is definitely impermissible.
It might say that she has no mandated options, or even no good options, but
it cannot say that every option is prohibited, as Conservative sometimes does.
So, let’s focus on Liberal.
White seeks to refute Liberal using a twist on his Coin Game example.
Suppose that subsequent to learning H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B, you must either
accept or decline a wager W that pays you $20 in the event of heads and costs
you $10 in the event of tails (where declining the wager means accepting a
straight payment of $0). Note that W is objectively favorable — its objective
expected payoff is $5 — and there is no doubt that you should take it prior to
my report. After the report things get dicey since, whether you learn H ≡ B
or H ≡ ∼B, your credal committee’s utilities for W will end up covering the
whole of the interval (20, −10). Supposing, as before, that your credal state has
members whose values for c(B) range over all of (0, 1), then the evaluations of
W look like this:
Table 2
Expc(W |H ≡ B) Expc(W |H ≡ ∼B)
c(H) < 1/3 Negative Positive
c(H) = 1/3 Zero Positive
2/3 > c(H) > 1/3 Positive Positive
c(H) = 2/3 Positive Zero
c(H) > 2/3 Positive Negative
Focus on the top and bottom rows. According to White, Liberal makes
it permissible, for purposes of action, for you to assign H any credence
represented in your post-learning credal state. Specifically, it is permissible for
you to act as if H’s (and B’s) probability is less than 1/3 upon learning H ≡ B,
and also to act as if H’s (and ∼B’s) probability is less than 1/3 upon learning
H ≡ ∼B. Since you act as if H has a probability below 1/3 either way, it
follows that it is permissible for you to reject W (in favor of $0) no matter what
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you learn! White rightly thinks that this would be absurd, but wrongly places
the blame on the imprecise model.
The blame really belongs with White’s version of Liberal, which presup-
poses the coarse conception of credal states found in ESET. White’s liberal
strategy only makes sense if you end up having the same maximally imprecise
beliefs about H whatever you learn. If this were so, there would be no problem
with acting as if c(H) < 1/3 in both posterior states, since there would really
be only one such state to consider. But, as we know, this is not how the
imprecise model works. From your prior perspective, your beliefs about H
upon learning H ≡ B are complementary to you beliefs about H upon learning
H ≡ ∼B. This complementarity is reflected in the utilities by the fact that the
identity Expc(W |H ≡ B) + Expc(W |H ≡ ∼B) = $10 holds for all c ∈ C.
I maintain that on any plausible account of rational decision making with
imprecise credences, this complementarity prevents you from turning down W
both when you learn H ≡ B and when you learn H ≡ ∼B.
To see why let’s start with an easier case. In his [2010] Adam Elga argues
that the imprecise model cannot satisfactorily explain why you should accept at
least one of the following bets, offered in succession: V = [Win $20 if B, Lose
$10 if ∼B], V⊥ = [Lose $10 if B, Win $20 if ∼B]. Elga, like White, considers a
“liberal” strategy that allows you to act as if c(B) < 1/3 when deciding whether
to accept or reject V , and then to act as if c(∼B) < 1/3 when deciding about
V⊥. He rightly dismisses this strategy, and goes on (successfully) to refute a
number of others designed to show how the imprecise model can force you to
accept V or V⊥. But, none of the strategies he discusses really gets to the heart
of the matter.
The critical fact is that the identity Expc(V ) + Expc(V⊥) = $10 holds
everywhere in your credal state, owing to the fact that, despite their maximal
imprecision, B and ∼B are contradictories (so that c(B) = 1 − c(∼B) holds
across C). It is thus a determinate fact about you that you disprefer V to a
straight payment of $x < $10 only if you prefer V⊥ to a straight payment
of $(10 − x), and conversely. It is not determinate whether you disprefer V
to $x or whether you prefer V⊥ to $(10 − x). What is determinate is that
your assessments of V and V⊥ are related so that Expc(V ) + Expc(V⊥) =
$10. As a result, if a decision rule is actually going to reflect your determinate
preferences, then it must satisfy the following requirement:
 The rule permits you to choose $x < $10 over V only if it requires
you to choose V⊥ over $(10 − x). Likewise, the rule permits you to
choose $x < $10 over V⊥ only if it requires you to choose V over
$(10 − x).
This idea can be extended in various ways, but for current purposes the key
point is that, whatever the final decision theory for imprecise credences looks
like, it will surely entail . To omit it is to adopt an overly coarse conception
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of credal states that fails to appreciate that your beliefs about B and ∼B are,
probabilistically speaking, mirror images of one another.22
Many potential decision rules satisfy , including all pragmatic sharpening
rules that obey Symmetry, but one that definitely does not is Liberalism (as used
by Elga and White). It should be clear that  precludes any rule that lets you
assume c(B) < 1/3 in your assessment of V and also assume c(∼B) < 1/3 in
you assessment of V⊥. Instead, it requires you to be consistent: if you do reject
V in favor of $0 on the basis of c(B) < 1/3 then you must also choose V⊥
over $10 (or any smaller sum) on that same basis. More generally,  ensures
that at least one of Elga’s wagers will always be chosen by any agent using any
reasonable decision rule.
To see why one of White’s wagers will always be chosen, we must further
explore the consequences of complementarity, particularly as they apply to
conditional preferences. Consider the following six wagers for a fixed y.
Table 3
(H ≡ B) & B (H ≡ B) & ∼B (H ≡ ∼B) & B (H ≡ ∼B) & ∼B
VH ≡B $20 −$10 $y $y
V⊥H ≡B −$10 $20 $y $y
[$x]H ≡B $x $x $y $y
VH ≡∼B $y $y $20 −$10
V⊥H ≡∼B $ y $y −$10 $20
[$x]H ≡∼B $y $y $x $x
Everywhere in C we have:
Expc(VH≡B) = Expc(VH≡∼B) = Expc(V) + $y
Expc(V⊥H≡B) = Expc(V⊥H≡∼B) = Expc(V⊥) + $y,
Expc([$x]H≡B) = Expc([$x]H≡∼B) = $x + $y
Thus, every committee member in your credal state will take the same stance
toward the VH ≡B versus [$x]H ≡B and VH ≡∼B versus [$x]H ≡∼B questions as she
takes toward V versus $x. Likewise she will take the same stance toward the
V⊥H ≡B versus [$(10 − x)]H ≡B and V⊥H ≡∼B versus [$(10 − x)]H ≡∼B questions
as she takes toward V⊥ versus $(10 − x). This is a determinate fact about your
preferences. To respect it any acceptable decision rule for imprecise probabilities
should satisfy the following constraint for every value of y:
The rule permits/requires/prohibits the choice of $x < $10 over V if
and only if it also permits/requires/prohibits the choice of [$x]H ≡B
over VH ≡B and the choice of [$x]H ≡∼B over VH ≡∼B. Likewise, the
rule permits/requires/prohibits the choice V⊥ over $(10 − x) if
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and only if it permits/requires/prohibits the choice of V⊥H ≡B over
[$(10 − x)]H ≡B and the choice of V⊥H ≡∼B over [$(10 − x)]H ≡∼B.
Another way to put this is to say that, in virtue of the complementarity inherent
in Coin Game, your choices between V and V⊥ and sums of money must
remain the same, ordinally speaking, whether they are made unconditionally or
are conditioned on either H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B.
Combining  with  produces the following interesting result:
 If your decision rule permits you to choose $0 over V conditional on
H ≡ B, then it also requires you to choose V⊥ over $10 conditional
on H ≡ ∼B.
The argument goes like this: If your rule permits you to choose $0 over V
conditional on H ≡ B, i.e., if it allows you to choose [$0]H ≡B over VH ≡B for
any y, then, by , it also permits you to choose $0 over V unconditionally.
But, if you are permitted to choose $0 over V unconditionally, then, by ,
you are required to choose V⊥ over $10 or any smaller sum. But, if you are
required to choose V⊥ over $10 or any smaller sum, then, by , you are also
required to choose V⊥ over $10 or any smaller sum conditional on H ≡ ∼B.
For the next step, define conditional versions of White’s wager W as
follows:
Table 4
(H ≡ B) & H (H ≡ B) & ∼H (H ≡ ∼B) & H (H ≡ ∼B) & ∼H
WH ≡B $20 −$10 $y $y
WH ≡∼B $y $y $20 −$10
Notice that WH ≡B is identical to VH ≡B and that WH ≡∼B is identical to
V⊥H ≡∼B. Thus, your preferences for W and V coincide conditional on
H ≡ B, and your preferences for W and V⊥ coincide conditional on H ≡ ∼B.
This lets us rewrite  as
 If your decision rule permits you to choose $0 over W conditional on
H ≡ B, then it also requires you to choose W over $10 conditional
H ≡ ∼B.
This is close to what we want. It says that, from the perspective of your prior
beliefs, it would be incoherent of you to have a decision-making policy, like
Liberal, that allows you to you reject W no matter what you learn. If your
decision rule reflects your actual preferences to the extent that  and 
require, then you must deem White’s wager choiceworthy either in the event
318 / James M. Joyce
that heads/tails is correlated with black/grey or in the event that heads/tails
is correlated with grey/black.
This answer is unlikely to satisfy White. He was careful to frame his
example in terms of your posterior beliefs, not your prior conditional beliefs.
He wants to know why it is wrong for you to turn down W ex post, after you
learn H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B, but  is an ex ante constraint that speaks only
to the question of what decision strategies are coherent from the perspective of
the prior C. We can bridge the gap by requiring that the decisions you make in
your prospective posterior states CH ≡∼B and CH ≡B conform to the conditional
decisions you make in C. More precisely, the requirement is this:
Dynamic Consistency. A decision rule should permit/require/prohibit the choice
of $x over W in CH ≡B only if it permits/requires/prohibits the choice of $x over
W conditional on H ≡ B in C, i.e., only if it permits/requires/prohibits the
choice of [$x]H ≡B over WH≡B in C for every possible value of y. The same holds
with H ≡ B replaced by H ≡ ∼B.
If this holds then, on any reasonable decision theory for imprecise credences, it
is never allowable for you to reject White’s wager W no matter what you learn.
There are reasonable rules that tell you to accept W whatever you learn, but
none recommend uniform rejection.
This might seem like rigging the game. How, White might wonder, can a
decision rule legitimately restrict choices for wagers involving H in CH ≡∼B on
the basis of what it permits/requires/prohibits for similar wagers in CH ≡B?
After all, your belief state vis-a`-vis H is the same in CH ≡B as in CH ≡∼B. While
you can view the two states as complementary from the perspective of your prior,
after you have actually learned H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B you can no longer draw
this distinction. Posing the question ex post, there appears to be no relevant
difference between CH ≡B and CH ≡∼B when it comes to H’s probability. The
only thing that matters, ex post, is that your credence values for H are spread
across (0, 1), no considerations about the complementarity “directionality” of
the spread remains. So, on the reasonable principle that a decision rule must
produce the same output given the same relevant input, it seems to follow
that any rule which permits/requires/prohibits rejecting W in CH ≡B must also
permit/require/prohibit rejecting W in CH ≡∼B. Since the imprecise model lacks
the resources to mandate acceptance of W in both cases, it must permit it in
both cases. From this perspective, Dynamic Consistency looks like little more
than an ad hoc requirement to evaluate present options in the same way that
you evaluated past options, even when your epistemic position has changed.
While I agree that a brute prescription to make choices ex post just because
they seemed best ex ante is a nonstarter, this is not the situation here. It is quite
true that after learning H ≡ B or H ≡ ∼B you no longer inhabit a credal state
in which c(H|H ≡ B) = 1 − c(H |H ≡ ∼B).23 Even so, there is an intimate
connection between your prior conditional preferences and the preferences you
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have after learning. Learning H ≡ B transforms uncertainty about H versus
∼H into uncertainty about H & B versus ∼H & ∼B, and so the decision
you face is whether to accept $0 or a bet that pays $20 if H & B and costs
$10 if ∼H & ∼B. But, you have already taken a stand on this issue in your
conditional preferences! Your decision rule, whatever it might be, permits you to
choose $0 over W conditional on H ≡ B. Put differently, in a choice between
$0 if H ≡ B and $20 if H & B and –$10 if ∼H & ∼B, with the outcome
when H ≡ ∼B being entirely independent of what you do, it permits you to
choose $0. This is identical to the decision you face after learning H ≡ B.
While you do know, ex post, that H ≡ ∼B has been eliminated, that should
not affect your assessments of $0 versus [$20 if H & B, −$10 if ∼H & ∼B].
Since your decision rule permits you to choose $0 when the outcomes under
H ≡ ∼B are identical (and so irrelevant to what you choose), it should also
permit you to choose $0 when you know those outcomes will not come about.
So, while your decision rule does not allow you to choose $0 ex post merely
because it allows it ex ante, it should make the same recommendation in the
two situations because it should see them, in all relevant respects, as the same
decision. Similar remarks apply to the situation in which you learn H ≡ ∼B.
You choose differently here because you face a different decision. Instead of
comparing $0 to [$20 if H & B, −$10 if ∼H & ∼B] you compare it to [$20 if
H & ∼B, −$10 if ∼H & B]. For whatever reason, your decision rule considers
this a relevant difference, despite the fact that your credence committee leaves
the issue maximally undecided. If it did not consider the difference relevant
then it would not recommend different choices conditional on H ≡ B and
conditional on H ≡ ∼B. Given this, Dynamic Consistency asks only that your
rule should make the same assessments of the choiceworthiness of acts across
situations that it sees as relevantly similar. It should have you choose the same
way ex ante and ex post not because the former choice constrains the latter,
but because both choices are responding to the same (pragmatic and epistemic)
reasons.
In the end, then, the imprecise model, augmented by a decision rule that
obeys , ,  and Dynamic Consistency, has the resources to explain
why you must accept White’s wager Weither when you learn H ≡ B or when
you learn H ≡ ∼B.24 The decision-theoretic objections to the imprecise model
do not succeed.
Conclusion
While I cannot claim to have addressed all the objections that one might
conceivably raise to the imprecise model, I do hope to have shown that it is
more resilient than one might initially imagine. If we reject the overly coarse
conception of imprecise credences as ranges of probability values for events,
and embrace a richer conception that lets us distinguish stochastic dependence
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from unknown interaction and allows us to exploit complementarities, then
many seemingly problematic aspects of the model (e.g., dilation) are revealed
as advantages. This expressively richer model is, in my view, the best hope
we have of providing a representation of our doxastic states that is capable
of honestly recognizing that our beliefs should not be any more definitive or
unambiguous than the evidence we have for them.
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Berteld Kooi, Sarah Moss, Isaac Levi, Ram Neta, Jim Pryor, Erik Quaeghe-
beur, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Teddy Seidenfeld, Dan Singer, Brian Skyrms, Eric
Swanson, Mike Titelbaum, Brian Weatherson, Jon Williamson, and audiences at
Princeton, Rutgers, Carnegie Mellon, Brown, The University of Groningen and
the University of St. Andrews.
2. Intuitively,  is the set of propositions about which the believer is committed
to having an opinion. It must contain the necessary proposition, and be closed
under negation and countable disjunction.
3. These are the laws of finitely additive probability. Many Bayesians require
countable additivity, but the difference between finite and countable additivity
will not concern us here.
4. More generally, if learning alters the believer’s confidence in D without providing
new evidence that distinguishes among possibilities that might occur in the event
of D, then her posterior probability c∗ will obey c∗(X & D) = c(X)·c(D | X) for
all X∈ . This captures the idea of Jeffrey conditioning.
5. It can be shown that this is consistent with the idea that one should update by
Bayesian conditioning or Jeffrey conditioning. See Diaconis and Zabel [1982].
6. The probability of black on the first toss is
∫
1
0 x dx = 1/2. If you observe one
black and update, you obtain a posterior pdf of 2x·dx, and the probability of
getting a second black is
∫
1
0 p·(2x dx) = 2/3. If you observe a second black
and update, you get a pdf of 3x2·dx and the probability of a third head is∫
1
0 x·(3x2 dx) = 3/4. Et cetera.
7. I assume, harmlessly, that utility = money.
8. I first heard this analogy from Adam Elga, but have since heard others use it as
well.
9. It is unclear what majority rule would mean in this context, and the only
reasonable way to implement the differential weight idea would be to introduce
a probability μ measure over C and to use it to define an average credence for
the whole committee to reflect the person’s beliefs. This, however, would be to
reject the imprecise approach since these weighted averages amount to precise
credences. Proponents of the imprecise interpretation will point out, of course,
that in cases like Black/Grey or Game Show nothing in the evidence favors any
one choice of μ over any other.
10. Indeed, it reduces to POI in the finite case.
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11. This generalizes PSET (and LP) since a probability estimate for X can always
be interpreted as the assignment of an expected value to X ’s indicator function:
iX (X) = 1 and iX (∼X) = 0. In addition, if C(g) is an interval for each random
variable g, and if (as is reasonable in the present context) it is assumed that
C−(g + h) ≥ C−(g) + C−(h) and C−(a·g + b) = a·C−(g) + b when a and b are
any constants, then ESET is equivalent to the view, defended vigorously in Levi
[1974], that identifies a believer’s credal state with the convex set of probability
functions that generates her lower expectations. See Walley [1991] for details.
12. In its convex version ESET cannot even capture bare judgments of stochastic
independence. Suppose we initially represent your beliefs by the set C of all
probabilities defined over ±H & ±B with c(H & B) = c(H)·c(B), so that C’s
committee members all regard H and B as independent. Closing under convex
mixtures destroys the consensus: even if H and B are independent according
to c and c∗ it does not follow that H and B are independent relative to μ·c +
(1 − μ)·c∗ for 0 < μ < 1. Indeed, the only time this inference goes through
is when c(H) = c∗(H) or c(B) = c∗(B) or both. Thus, convex ESET says that
it is impossible to regard two events as independent without having a definite
credence for at least one of them. This is implausible on its face, as our earlier
example of the weather in Detroit and the Ashes cricket match shows.
13. It is crucial here that the coin is fair, not merely that its bias is known. For
a coin of known bias θ toward heads the answer one gets is c(B | H ≡ B) =
c(B)·θ/[(1 − θ ) + (2·θ − 1)·c(B)], which only reduces to c(B) when θ = 1/2 .
14. As this essay went to press I became aware of Scott Sturgeon’s treatment of a
similar problem in his [2010]. While I have not had time to fully digest Sturgeon’s
arguments, he does seem to agree with White on this point.
15. It is no simple matter to say what it is to possess inadmissible evidence for a
time-t chance assignment, but a useful sufficient condition is this: learning E
provides one with evidence that is inadmissible with respect to the assignment
chancet(X) = p when (i) 0 < c(E) < 1, (ii) c(chancet(X) = p | E) = c(chancet(X) =
p), and (iii) there is a time t∗ subsequent to t such that c(chancet∗ (X) = p | E) =
c(chancet∗ (X) = p). In the special case where E provides direct evidence about
X ’s outcome, learning E ensures that chancet∗ (X) = 1 for all t∗ beyond some
specified time.
16. Note that those for whom c(B) = 1/2 do not judge that H’s probability should
remain at 1/2 as a result of PP, i.e., they do not deem H ≡ B inadmissible and
align their beliefs with the known chances. They too regard H’s initial chance
as evidentially irrelevant to its posterior probability. They end up at c(H | H ≡
B) = 1/2 because c(B) = 1/2, not because chance0(H) = 1/2. Thanks to Branden
Fitelson for helping me to appreciate this.
17. Though superficially very different, this objection is importantly similar to one
discussed in van Fraassen [2006]. I would take the same general line of response
to that case as I do to this one.
18. Estimated incremental evidential relevance may be measured in a variety of ways,
but the differences won’t matter here. The same points can be made for every
such measure.
19. Let me be careful to distinguish this from what Elga [2010, p. 7] calls the “nar-
rowing proposal,” which he characterizes as the idea that “when a rational agent
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with unsharp probabilities performs an action her probabilities typically become
more sharp or well-defined than they were before.” This is not sharpening!
Sharpening does not have agents change their beliefs as a result of what they
choose.
20. In localized contexts, where diachronic Dutch books should be avoided, one
may want to insist that all the C#’s have a non-empty intersection. I think
diachronic consistency is a highly local matter, however, and would resist any
strong requirement along these lines. It is often not a mistake to perform an
action that, when conjoined with past acts, produces a Dutch book.
21. Let me note that I think that the categorical notions of a permissible act or an
impermissible act are out of place in an imprecise framework, but I will not press
this issue here.
22. In some of his criticisms Elga stresses that V and V⊥ are presented in succession,
but I do not see how this affects my argument. To be clear, I am not imaging
that a decision rule would tell you what to do about V⊥ by relating it to what
you already did about V . It addresses each of your choices individually. So, I am
definitely not advancing a version of what Elga calls the “sequence proposal,”
which hopes to derive the conclusion that you must choose one of V or V⊥ from
the premise that it would be irrational to perform the sequence V -followed-by-
V⊥. Refusing both V and V⊥ indicates that a mistake has been made, but the
mistake is not either that of refusing-V -before-refusing-V⊥ or that of refusing-
V⊥-after-refusing-V . It is the mistake of having (static) preferences that fail to
reflect the fact that Expc(V ) + Expc(V⊥) = $10.
23. Some Bayesians (e.g., Joyce [1999]) think it makes sense to have conditional
probabilities for conditioning events of probability zero. This would make it
possible to preserve complementarity even after one biconditional is learned, in
which case the argument of this paragraph would be even more direct.
24. Some people want a theory that requires you to accept the wager whatever you
learn. While I do not find this request terribly reasonable, the imprecise model
can honor it, e.g., by adopting a pragmatic sharpening strategy that eliminates
all the credences for H that fall outside the interval (1/3, 2/3).
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